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1. Philosophical characteristics of general objects
In ontology we study real things as well as ideal, abstract, or general ones. 
Ingarden distinguished in his existential ontology the following types of objects: 
1) ideal (or Platonic ideal entities), 2) absolute being (God), 3) purely intentional
objects (like works of art), and 4) objects of the real world like substances 
(Socrates), processes (100-metre sprint), or events (birthday of Plato). Here, we 
are only interested – according to Ingarden’s terms – in ideal (general) objects. 
In this case we think usually about mathematical objects (triangle, number), 
about ideal entities (beauty, justice), and also about species and/or genera 
(a man, an animal), or concepts (like the concept of man, the concept of the 
ether, the concept of natural sciences). In turn, Meinong distinguished so-called 
complete and incomplete objects.1 The first are objects, such that for every 
property P they either have P or non-P (where non-P is a property called the 
complement of P; for example: if P is whiteness, then non-whiteness (non-P) is 
the complement of whiteness). Incomplete objects, by contrast, are objects such 
that for some P they neither have P nor non-P. Incomplete objects are
counterparts of Platonic forms, ideal objects, or general ones, and these we 
are interested in. On the whole, these kinds of objects are characterized as 
existing (or subsisting – according to Russell) out of time and space. They are 
called eternal objects by Whitehead and interpreted as Platonic beings, which 
are unchangeable, and independent of our cognition. 
1 See MEINONG [1915], § 25.
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As we know, Kotarbiński rejected the Platonic approach to ideal (or general) 
objects. The class of objects rejected by him was rather wide and rich. He threw 
off such objects as species, genera, properties, state of affairs, or sets (in 
the mathematical sense). He was, simply, a nominalist. In his The problem of the 
existence of ideal objects (comp. KOTARBIŃSKI [1920]) he criticized 
the existence of universals. Kotarbiński started from the following definition of 
universal: An object Go will be a general object on the ground of object O, that 
possesses only collective (or common) properties for objects O.2 Based on this 
definition, Kotarbiński proved that the definition leads to contradiction. Namely, 
let p be a peculiar property of an object O’;  that means that for any other object 
O’’, such that O’’O’, p is not a property of O’’; this kind of p has to exist, 
because otherwise two or more objects O would be identical; but on the ground 
of the principle of excluded middle, Go has p or the negation of p (i.e. p); next, 
if Go has p then Go has a property peculiar to O’ and not to O’’, so Go does not 
possess common properties to O; in the same way, if Go has p, then Go has 
a property that is not a property of O’ and Go does not possess common 
properties of O. Thus, it is a contradiction.  
This means – according to Kotarbiński’s dictum – that the concept of a general 
object cited by him is a contradictory one.  
2. Criticism of Kotarbiński’s approach from Ingarden
and Ajdukiewicz
Kotarbiński’s paper was a continuation of the controversy on the existence of 
universals, begun by Łukasiewicz in 1906 when the latter published his 
Analysis.3 Kotarbiński’s standpoint was then criticised, for example, by 
Ajdukiewicz and Ingarden. As far as the details of this criticism are concerned, 
we propose refering to the original papers.4
Let us remark, however, that both Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz did not accept 
– and what’s more, they rejected – Kotarbiński’s reistic attitude. Ajdukiewicz, in
his review of Elements, criticised reism in its ontological version and the concept 
of the reduction of different ontological categories to the category of things.5 He 
accepted only the so called reism in its semantic version as a method of 
eliminating utterances with onomatoids, i.e. with apparent names.6 In turn, 
2 See KOTARBIŃSKI [1920], reprint [in:] Wybór pism, t. II; Selection of Papers, vol. II, p. 13. 
3 Comp. ŁUKASIEWICZ [1906].
4 Comp. INGARDEN [1923] and AJDUKIEWICZ [1930].
5 Comp. AJDUKIEWICZ [1930]. 
6 For example, the sentence: Wisdom is a property of some human beings (with two apparent 
names wisdom and property) can be replaced by: Some human beings are wise. 
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Ingarden (in reply to KOTARBIŃSKI [1920]7) reprimanded Kotarbiński for 
using ambiguous terms and, in consequence, ambiguous definitions and 
theorems to explain the reistic approach. For example, Ingarden rejected the 
definition of an ideal object as only an “object of our mind”, as well as the reistic 
understanding of mathematical abstract objects or the definition of general 
objects as in point 1 above.  
One can conclude that Kotarbiński’s ideas were misbegotten. But, on the other 
hand, the decided response from the Polish philosophical academic world shows 
that the problems touched upon were the main ones; and theses concerning 
general or ideal objects, properties or species were not clearly formulated at this 
time. For the most part, criticism from other philosophers was a consequence of 
a radical formulation of reism. Kotarbiński’s “Ockham razor” was later called by 
Janina Kotarbińska “Kotarbiński’s besom”. 
In what follows, I will approach Kotarbiński’s considerations using some tools 
of formal ontology and the exact concepts proposed by this field of philosophy.  
3. On some representation of general objects and individuals
I will present a formal approach to general or ideal objects, to their structure, and 
to individuals. Terms, concepts, and definitions are introduced in KACZMA-
REK [2008a], and KACZMAREK [2008b].   
Let us recall the so called binary tree defined in mathematics. So, if X is a set 
and  is a reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive relation, then X,  is to be 
called a partially ordered set. If X,  is partially ordered and for any xX the 
set O(x) = {y: y X &y x} is a chain, then X,  is a pseudo-tree. If, 
additionally, any set O(x) is a well-founded set (i.e. every nonempty subset of 
O(x) has a minimal element), then the pseudo-tree X,  is called a tree. The set 
of all functions ai from {0, 1, ..., n} to {0, 1}, for n (the set of natural 
numbers), with relation of inclusion is an example of a tree and is called a total 
binary tree (shortly: TBT). The set  is a minimal object referred to as a root of 
the tree. We can represent a fragment of this tree by the following picture.  

(0) (1) 
(0, 0)     (0, 1)        (1, 0)         (1, 1) 
………………………………………...
7 See INGARDEN [1923]. 
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Precisely, for example the object (0, 1) is a function a such that a(0) = 0, a(1) = 1 
i.e. the set {<0, 0>, <1, 1>}.  
Now, we employ the total binary tree to define formally the set of well-known 
beings, namely the set of species and genera called a Porphyrian tree.   
Let T be a countable (and infinite) set and T’ its infinite subset. Let us define 
a set PT of all functions e: T’ {0, ½, 1} such that }1,0{)( te for t },...,{ 1 ntt ,
where },...,{ 1 ntt  is a subset of T’, n = 0, 1, 2, …, and e(t) = ½ for tT’ – {t0, t1,
..., tn}, and let  be a relation fulfilling a condition: e e’  iff e101 e’, where 01
refers to inclusion on the sets of these pairs <t, k> of e and e’ for which k = 0 
or k = 1. It is a fact that PT, is a tree. Moreover, PT,  is isomorphic 
with the binary tree (defined on a set of natural numbers). 
A counterpart of  in PT is the function e: T’ {½}. We can call this tree, by 
analogy, a total Porphyrian tree. Why? 
Example 1. The set T we interpret as a set of properties, each function e as 
a general object or an idea that has its content. Namely, let t1, t2, t3, t4, represent 
properties “is material”, “is organic”, “is sensual”, “is rational”. If we now look 
into a function e’: T’ {0, ½, 1}, such that e’({t1, t2, t3, t4}) = 1 and e’(t) = ½ for 
tT’ – {t1, ..., t4}, then we will interpret the function e’ as the idea of a man 
(human being), because any human being is a material, organic, sensual and 
rational substance.  
Now we will take some finite subset PTFIN of PT. Let   PTFIN   PT and PTFIN
be a set fulfilling the following conditions: 
(1) there exists e PTFIN such that for any e’ PTFIN :e e’, 
(2) for any e’ PTFIN : if there exists e’’ such that e’’ e’ and e’ e’’, then there 
exists e’’’ PTFIN such that: (a) e’’’ e’’, (b) e’’’ e’, (c) ( e’’ e’’’ or e’’’ 
e’’) and (d) e’ e’’’. Then it is easy to prove that (PTFIN, ) is a tree. 
We have to explain that Condition (1) forces one root, and also Condition (2) 
that after any object e (in the sense of relation ) there exist 0, 2, ..., n elements 
(but not 1), for n.  The structure PTFIN,  is parallel with the structure of 
genera and species that is due to philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Porphyry and 
others. Thus, the relation  may be called over and its converse under. In this 
way, the concept that one species (e.g. a man) is under another (e.g. an animal) 
may be grasped.  
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e0
   (substance) 
         e1            e2 
(immaterial)      (material, body) 
e3   e4
          (inanimate, stone)    (animate or living, plants) 
e5               e6 
  (unsensual, rose)   (sensual, animals) 
e7      e8 
         (irrational, other animals)    (rational, human) 
 (dog, cat, frog)                      (Socrate) 
Figure. Classical Porphyrian tree. According to Example 1 e2 and e8 are 
functions T’ {0, ½, 1} and e2(t1) = 1, e2(T’ – {t1}) = ½, e8({t1, t2, t3, t4}) = 1 and 
e8(T’ – {t1, ..., t4}) = ½. 
Let us now define that the structure PTFIN,  is a simplified Porphyrian tree 
structure, shortly: PTS.  An element e from PTFIN is to be called an incomplete 
object (in Meinongian terms). If e(t) = 1 or e(t) = 0, feature t is an essential 
positive or negative feature, respectively. Next, if e(t) = ½, then t is an accidental 
or unspecified feature. Of course, it is necessary to point out that we do not treat 
these properties (features) as the properties of incomplete objects (of genera or 
species). They are properties of complete objects (individuals) generated by the 
first, and following Ingarden’s ontology we accept that these properties belong 
to the content of an idea and are not the idea’s properties. They construct the 
content of the idea and are properties of what exemplifies the given idea.  
If e PTS and for any e’e: (e’ under e), then we can call e natural species in 
PTS. If NS is a set of all natural species of PTS and G = PTS – NS, then elements 
of G are to be called proper genera of PTS. Of course, any two species of PTS
are incomparable with regard to under. It means that for any two species e’ and 
e’’: (e’ under e’’) and (e’’ under e’).   
In the light of these definitions we can propose formal definition of complete 
objects. Namely, let e NS, De be a domain of e and Ue be a set of all functions 
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o from De into {0, 1} such that e 01 o. Then any function o Ue is called
a complete object generated by species e. Next, a set 
e
ePTS UU  , for any 
e  NS, is an universe (or domain) of PTS.
Remark. It is evident that a set of complete objects generated by e can be 
interpreted as a set of individuals (like Socrates, Plato, Thomas) with the same 
essence (species). Evidently, Socrates has positive and/or negative properties 
fixed in the species as positive and/or negative, respectively, but additionally, all 
accidental properties from the content of the species (with value ½) are positive 
and/or negative (i.e. with a value of 1 or 0) in the case of the individual 
– Socrates. For example, in the so called intended interpretation, the property “is
healthy” has value ½ in species “a man” but value 1 in individual Socrates 
(being healthy is a positive accidental property of Socrates at a given time).  
4. Kotarbiński’s argument in formal ontology
Formal ontology, in my opinion, has an advantage over ontology that is 
inscribed in natural language. It allows us to construct rigorous definitions and 
arguments that are used in considering ontological problems. Above we gave 
Kotarbiński’s proof for the thesis that the notion of a general object is 
contradictory. The reasons for the thesis can be different.8 Still, I want to 
propose an exact (and formal) definition of a general object and recreate 
Kotarbiński’s line of reasoning wherein he speaks about an object possessing 
a property and uses the principle of excluded middle.  
4.1. Let us assume that any object e is a general one if and only if e is an element 
of PTS (in line with what was proposed in point 3). In a part of his argument, 
Kotarbiński posits that any general object Go has a property p or negation p. If 
so, in the proposed formalism we can say:  
(i) For any object e from PTS and any property t: e(t) = 1 or e(t) = 0. 
We interpret Kotarbiński’s claim hoping that it is an appropriate interpretation. 
If so, it is easy to prove that Condition (i) is not true in PTS structures because 
we have the following true sentence: 
(ii) For any e there are exist a property t such that: e(t) = ½, 
8 Compare criticism of Kotarbiński’s attitude given in AJDUKIEWICZ [1930] or INGARDEN 
[1923]. 
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Thus the sentence: 
(iii) e(t) = 1 or e(t) = 0    
is not true.  
Of course the following sentence is true: 
(iv) For any object e and any property t: e(t) = 1 or(e(t) = 1),
because, as we fixed in PTS structures: 
(v) For any e and t: e(t) = 1  or e(t) = 0  or e(t) =  ½.
But from Kotarbiński’s paper9 we conclude that he did not think about the 
formulation of (iv). A problem we touch on here concerns a controversial 
question: how to understand a connective of negation (the so called de dicto and 
de re) and an application of the principle of excluded middle. I think that 
Kotarbiński had in mind Condition (i). This means that his argument is 
misguided. In the class of PTS, the principle of excluded middle does not work.  
4.2. In a similar way I criticise Kotarbiński’s view according to which he 
ascribed any property to an object. For example, in his second proof against 
general objects, he claims that if an universal has a property “being a general,” 
then it is a common property for all things exemplified by the universal. Thus 
– according to Kotarbiński – each thing exemplified by an universal is also
general and, in consequence, exemplified things and universals are identical. 
I am opposed to this view.  
According to the formal ontology given above (point 3),10 with each class of 
objects there is bound some class of properties that are owned by the objects. For 
example, a number can be even or odd but it cannot be healthy or not. In turn, 
Socrates can be healthy but neither even nor odd. Similarly, ideas have 
properties different from individuals exemplifying those ideas. In our formal 
ontology we can show for example that the idea of a human being (like other 
species) is not “more general” than another. Formally:
(vi) If e is a species, then for any object e’ from PTS: (e’ under e). 
This kind of property (or its negation) has no other object exemplifying the 
general object (idea) e.  
9 Compare KOTARBIŃSKI [1920]. 
10 For details see KACZMAREK [2008a], pp. 121–129. 
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e  NS, is an universe (or domain) of PTS.
Remark. It is evident that a set of complete objects generated by e can be 
interpreted as a set of individuals (like Socrates, Plato, Thomas) with the same 
essence (species). Evidently, Socrates has positive and/or negative properties 
fixed in the species as positive and/or negative, respectively, but additionally, all 
accidental properties from the content of the species (with value ½) are positive 
and/or negative (i.e. with a value of 1 or 0) in the case of the individual 
– Socrates. For example, in the so called intended interpretation, the property “is
healthy” has value ½ in species “a man” but value 1 in individual Socrates 
(being healthy is a positive accidental property of Socrates at a given time).  
4. Kotarbiński’s argument in formal ontology
Formal ontology, in my opinion, has an advantage over ontology that is 
inscribed in natural language. It allows us to construct rigorous definitions and 
arguments that are used in considering ontological problems. Above we gave 
Kotarbiński’s proof for the thesis that the notion of a general object is 
contradictory. The reasons for the thesis can be different.8 Still, I want to 
propose an exact (and formal) definition of a general object and recreate 
Kotarbiński’s line of reasoning wherein he speaks about an object possessing 
a property and uses the principle of excluded middle.  
4.1. Let us assume that any object e is a general one if and only if e is an element 
of PTS (in line with what was proposed in point 3). In a part of his argument, 
Kotarbiński posits that any general object Go has a property p or negation p. If 
so, in the proposed formalism we can say:  
(i) For any object e from PTS and any property t: e(t) = 1 or e(t) = 0. 
We interpret Kotarbiński’s claim hoping that it is an appropriate interpretation. 
If so, it is easy to prove that Condition (i) is not true in PTS structures because 
we have the following true sentence: 
(ii) For any e there are exist a property t such that: e(t) = ½, 
8 Compare criticism of Kotarbiński’s attitude given in AJDUKIEWICZ [1930] or INGARDEN 
[1923]. 
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Thus the sentence: 
(iii) e(t) = 1 or e(t) = 0    
is not true.  
Of course the following sentence is true: 
(iv) For any object e and any property t: e(t) = 1 or(e(t) = 1),
because, as we fixed in PTS structures: 
(v) For any e and t: e(t) = 1  or e(t) = 0  or e(t) =  ½.
But from Kotarbiński’s paper9 we conclude that he did not think about the 
formulation of (iv). A problem we touch on here concerns a controversial 
question: how to understand a connective of negation (the so called de dicto and 
de re) and an application of the principle of excluded middle. I think that 
Kotarbiński had in mind Condition (i). This means that his argument is 
misguided. In the class of PTS, the principle of excluded middle does not work.  
4.2. In a similar way I criticise Kotarbiński’s view according to which he 
ascribed any property to an object. For example, in his second proof against 
general objects, he claims that if an universal has a property “being a general,” 
then it is a common property for all things exemplified by the universal. Thus 
– according to Kotarbiński – each thing exemplified by an universal is also
general and, in consequence, exemplified things and universals are identical. 
I am opposed to this view.  
According to the formal ontology given above (point 3),10 with each class of 
objects there is bound some class of properties that are owned by the objects. For 
example, a number can be even or odd but it cannot be healthy or not. In turn, 
Socrates can be healthy but neither even nor odd. Similarly, ideas have 
properties different from individuals exemplifying those ideas. In our formal 
ontology we can show for example that the idea of a human being (like other 
species) is not “more general” than another. Formally:
(vi) If e is a species, then for any object e’ from PTS: (e’ under e). 
This kind of property (or its negation) has no other object exemplifying the 
general object (idea) e.  
9 Compare KOTARBIŃSKI [1920]. 
10 For details see KACZMAREK [2008a], pp. 121–129. 
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5. Conclusions
My opinion of Kotarbinski’s work in the area of ontology and semiotics is this. 
His work is an example of proper and multisided investigations despite different 
criticisms. In the present paper I pointed out some gaps in Kotarbinski’s 
ontological proposal evident from a formal ontology point of view. This 
criticism, of course, would not be possible without readable definitions and 
argumentations that were pioneered or excerpted by Kotarbiński. One can have 
ontological objections to these formulations, but in any case we can appreciate 
the Author’s attitude. 
As we know, logical and formal tools were just being developed in the 1910s 
and 1920s. An old problem of general objects or universals was entertained by 
numerous logicians (e.g. Leśniewski, Łukasiewicz, Ajdukiewicz and 
Kotarbiński) in this new logical form with the hope of finally elaborating it. 
Łukasiewicz’s analysis of general objects and Meinongian incomplete objects 
probably resulted in the construction (discovery) of many-valued logics,11
Leśniewski’s works on the connective “is” led us to the so called Leśniewski’s 
Ontology,12 and Kotarbiński’s reism initiated the ontological and semiotic 
question: how much can we cut out with Kotarbiński’s besom or Ockham’s 
razor? Kotarbiński’s ontological attitude, also by its radicalism, is therefore 
a trampoline for following logically oriented ontological investigations.  
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